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NOTES

Signal and Affirm: How the United
Nations Should Articulate the
Right to Remedial Secession
ABSTRACT

In international law, the right of peoples to selfdetermination as applied to remedial secession is anything but
clear. The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to
clarify this area of law in its recent advisory opinion concerning
the unilateral declaration of independence made by Kosovo.
Much to the disappointment of internationalcommentators, the
Court expressly declined to adjudicate whether Kosovo had, by
its declaration, attained state status. Instead, the Court
declared that international law does not prohibit unilateral
declarations of independence. This Note argues that the proper
method for the United Nations to articulateinternationallaw of
secession is via resolution of the General Assembly combined
with applicationof that resolution by the InternationalCourt of
Justice. This is the method the United Nations used when it
articulated another form of the right to self-determination, the
right to be free from colonization. The method's success in this
latter area demonstrates its viability for the right to secession, a
similarly situated right.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A fundamental tension exists between a sovereign state's
interest in maintaining territorial integrity and the right of peoples to
self-determination.' On one hand, modern international law has
developed under the assumption that states are the proper units for
creating a system of international rights and obligations. 2 Under this
system, states are entitled to be free from external interference when
3
However, a state's sovereign
exercising sovereign authority.
authority is not absolute; precedent suggests that states become

1.
See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (4th ed. 2001)
(stating that reconciliation of the right to self-determination and other competing
principles is one of the most difficult problems the international legal system currently
faces); Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declarationof Independence: "Botchingthe Balkans"
or Respecting International Law?, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 267, 276 (2009)
("[S]ecession seems inherently at odds with the principles of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity .... ").
2.
See Karl Doehring, Self Determination, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 48, 50 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) ("The starting point
.
was the assumption that nations represent a natural structure of mankind .
3.
Id.
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vulnerable to legitimate ouster when they abuse their power against
4
the will of their subjects.
Kosovo unilaterally declared
17, 2008,
On February
of
Serbia. 5 With the UN Security
Republic
independence from The
Council paralyzed by permanent members vetoing any resolution
addressing the matter, the UN General Assembly requested an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
principle judicial organ created by the United Nations Charter (the
Charter), to determine the declaration's legal validity. 6 Some
commentators considered the opinion the most important case ever to
come before the Court.7 To the disappointment of many international
commentators-not to mention the dissenting justices on the Courtthe ICJ interpreted the General Assembly's question narrowly and
expressly refused to opine on whether or not Kosovo's declaration of
independence is sufficient for it to achieve statehood.8 Instead, the
of
opinion merely stated that Kosovo's unilateral declaration
9
independence is not prohibited under international law.
The right to self-determination can be divided into two broad
categories: internal and external. 10 Internal self-determination
concerns a people's right to pursue political, economic, and cultural
goals within the framework of an existing state.11 It includes the
right to free expression, the right to vote, and the right to take part in
public affairs. 12 A people invoking the right to internal selfdetermination does not challenge the legitimacy of the sovereign per

4.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("But when a
long train of abuses and usurpations ... evinces a design to reduce them under
absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
government .... ); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 134
(Can.) ("[When a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.");
Diane F. Orentlicher, InternationalResponses to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic
Principles Relevant?, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 19, 22 (Stephen Macedo
& Allen Buchanan eds., 2003) (describing more recent versions of the right to remedial
secession to include a situation where "a defined subpopulation is persistently excluded
from full political participation").
5.
Dan Bilefsky, In a Showdown, Kosovo Declares Its Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at Al.
6.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 1 (July 22).
Peter Beaumont, US Backs Kosovan Independence Regardless of UN
7.
Ruling, GUARDIAN (London) (July 22, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
(quoting James Ker2010/jul/22/kosovo-independence-us-support?INTCMP=SRCH
Lindsay, a Balkans expert at The London School of Economics and Political Science).
Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 51.
8.
Id.
122.
9.
10.
See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.)
(stating that international law recognizes both internal and external forms of selfdetermination).
11.
Id.
12.
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 53 (1995).

214

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.'211

se; instead, the people challenge the manner in which that sovereign
is exercising its power. On the other hand, external selfdetermination refers to a people's ability to create a new state or
other political status. 13 Generally, the existence of the right to
external self-determination is not in dispute. 14 A group of people
invoking this right is challenging the very legitimacy of the sovereign.
External self-determination only arises in a few unusual
circumstances. 15 It arises when a colony claims independence from
imperial rule, 16 when a people claim that a state is occupying its
country illegally, 17 and most controversially, it might arise when a
minority group cannot meaningfully exercise its rights to internal
self-determination and seeks to secede from an already established
state.' 8 The first two of these three circumstances are relatively well
defined; the final one is not.' 9 As applied to remedial secession, the
right is vague and uncertain. 20 The ICJ had the opportunity to
further develop the international law of the third circumstance in the
Kosovo advisory opinion but was unwilling or unable to do so.
The ICJ's hesitation to opine further on this right in the Kosovo
advisory opinion may have stemmed from a desire to avoid entering
the political thicket surrounding a difficult problem in international
law. 21 On the other hand, it might have been the result of a good faith
interpretation of the General Assembly's slightly ambiguous
question. 22 In either case, the result seems contrary to the ordinary
meaning of the phrase: "declaration of independence" and, as such,
contravenes the almost certain intent of the General Assembly when

13.
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. para. 126.
14.
DAMROSCH ET AL., supranote 1, at 268-69.
15.
CASSESE, supra note 12, at 334; see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive to these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to
institute new Government ... when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursing
invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism,
it is their Right, it is their Duty to throw off such Government ... .
16.
CASSESE, supra note 12, at 334.
17.
Id.
18.
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. para. 126 ("A right to external selfdetermination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right
to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme cases, and, even then, under
carefully defined circumstances."); id. para. 134 (noting that many international
commentators have stated that "when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise
of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise is
by secession").
19.
See infra Part III.
20.
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 273 ("The international instruments
referring to a right of self-determination of 'peoples' do not make clear whether the
right applies outside the decolonization context ... .
21.
See supra note 1.
22.
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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it exercised its power to seek guidance from the Court on this
question of international law.
The ICJ, has opined on external self-determination on several
occasions; 23 nonetheless, the scope of the right-with the exception of
the colonial circumstance-remains controversial. 24 The relative
precision of the right in the colonial context is largely a result of the
General Assembly's leadership combined with subsequent approval of
the ICJ. 25 Outside the colonial context, the relative lack of guidance
from the United Nations has created holes in international law that
have been exploited by some countries in an effort to promote their
geopolitical interests. 26 These holes create a potential for states to
engage in armed conflict as the rest of the world wonders whether the
aggressing state's actions are legal. 2 7 Even contemporaries of the
colonial era foresaw that vagueness in the right to self-determination
28
would threaten international peace and security.
This Note adopts the following premise: the United Nations
ought to lay down a basic framework for the right to remedial
secession. This premise flows from the reality that vagueness in
defining this fundamentally important right has led and probably will
lead to continued armed conflict and the United Nations is
responsible for maintaining international peace and security. 29 This
Note also takes it as a given that the General Assembly wants to
have a framework and wants the ICJ to apply that framework. This
assumption is likely because of the General Assembly's decision to
seek guidance from the 1CJ in the Kosovo instance.
Taking this premise as a given, this Note argues that the proper
method for the United Nations to articulate the scope of the right to
remedial secession-whatever that scope turns out to be-is the
(4signal and affirm" method. This method was used by the General
Assembly when it articulated the right to self-determination with
respect to peoples located in colonized territories.30 The General

See infra Part 111.
23.
24.
See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 269.
See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 89 (suggesting that the reason the ICJ
25.
views the right to self-determination liberally in the colonial context was "to a large
extent borne out by UN practice").
See infra Part III.B.
26.
Id.
27.
See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Self-determination in International Law: The
28.
Tragic Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan)and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 322 (1972) ("[I]nternal conflicts whose basis is a desire for selfdetermination may pose a major threat in the future of international peace and
security.").
See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 ("The purposes of the United Nations are:
29.
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace .... ").
See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
30.
Relations Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
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Assembly could have taken this approach rather than referring the
issue to the ICJ. Now that the Court has not resolved the scope of the
right to remedial secession, the General Assembly ought to adopt a
remedial secession resolution that sets standards for the ICJ to apply
in contentious cases. This method takes advantage of these organ's
strengths and avoids their weaknesses.
Before beginning the argument, it is important to head off an
important objection: namely that it is not a good idea in principle to
articulate the right to remedial secession because of the increased
risks of civil war and oppression. 31 It is not knowable how much
armed conflict will be avoided by clarity in the right to remedial
secession 32 and how much will be created by it. However, the General
Assembly has-by the act of asking the ICJ for an advisory opinion
concerning the international law of secession 3 3-made the policy
decision that clarity is the right course to take. This policy judgment
deserves respect. Once the objector concedes that the General
Assembly may decide to pursue its apparent goal of creating a
remedial secession framework, the objector should then ask, "What is
the proper method for the General Assembly to pursue that goal?"
Part II of this Note summarizes and analyzes the ICJ's Kosovo
advisory opinion. Part III describes other forms of the right to
external self-determination that have been more fully codified in
international law. Lessons from international lawmaking in these
areas inform this Note's proposed solution because these forms of the
right to self-determination raise similar challenges to articulating the
right to remedial secession. Part IV analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of various methods of international lawmaking. Part V

Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly
Relations Declaration] ("The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory
has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State
administering it .. "); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV),
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 4,
1960) [hereinafter Colonial Countries Declaration] ("The subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights .. "); see also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16,
52 (June 21) ("A further
important stage in this development was the Declaration of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, which embraces all peoples, and territories which have not yet
attained independence." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31.
See, e.g., infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (illustrating geopolitical
controversy surrounding Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia).
32.
See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text (arguing that clarity will
make disputes concerning remedial secession more likely to be peacefully resolved).
33.
I am assuming that the General Assembly asked a broader question than
the Court ultimately answered. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65 (agreeing
with the weight of other commentary that the Court's interpretation of the General
Assembly's question is overly narrow).
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argues that the signal and affirm method is the best method for
articulating the right as applied to remedial secession.

II. MISSED OPPORTUNITY: THE ICJ BALKS AT A FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Kosovo Declares Independence
declared
17,
2008, Kosovo unilaterally
On
February
independence from Serbia.3 4 The news filled Kosovo's streets with
tens of thousands of people in celebration. 35 Some beat drums
36
declaring, "Independence! Independence! We are free at last!"
Others put a one hundred foot long birthday cake in the capitol's
37
main street.
Outside Kosovo, the response varied. Some countries recognized
Kosovo as a new state and some did not.38 The Serbian government
immediately denied the validity of the declaration. 39 Serbian Prime
Minister Vokislav Kostunica stated, "Our final word is that no one
but Serbia can claim the right to the territory of Kosovo. No police or
force can strip Serbia of that right .... ,,40
From a geopolitical perspective, the declaration was the latest
development in a political conflict between western countries and the
Kremlin. 4 1 Serbia, supported by Russia, urged the Security Council to
find the declaration invalid; however, the United States took the
position that the declaration was consistent with applicable
international law. 4 2 With two of its permanent members taking
opposite positions, the Security Council was not able to pass a
resolution on the matter. 43 Instead, the General Assembly passed a
44
resolution asking for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.

34.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, T 57 (July 22).
35.
Bilefsky, supra note 5, at Al.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
G.A. Res. 63/3, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008) ("Aware that
this act has been received with varied reactions by the Members of the United Nations
as to its compatibility with the existing legal order."); see Sterio, supra note 1, at 269
(stating that most western governments recognized Kosovo as a new state despite
Serbian protest).
39.
Louise Radnosfsky, Belgrade Refuses to Recognise Kosovo's Statehood
Claim, GUARDIAN (London) (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/
feb/13/serbia.kosovo.
40.
Id.
41.
Dan Bilefsky, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence Is Within Law, U.N.
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A4.
42.
Id.
43.
See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (requiring all non-procedural Security
Council decisions to be endorsed by every permanent member); see also id. art. 23,
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B. The ICJ's (Non) Advisory Opinion
The Charter grants the General Assembly the right to request an
'4 5
advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding "any legal question.
However the Court, in its discretion, may decline to give an advisory
opinion. 46 According to the Court, it should not refuse a properly
made request for an advisory opinion unless there are "compelling
reasons" for it to do so. 47 That its ruling might lead to adverse
political consequences is not a sufficient reason for the Court to
decline to give an advisory opinion. 48 The purpose of the Court's
advisory jurisdiction is to enable UN organs to obtain opinions that
49
will help them exercise their functions.
After concluding that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory
opinion and that there is no compelling reason against providing the
opinion, the ICJ turned to the task of interpreting the General
Assembly's question: "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in
accordance with international law? '50 The Court considered the
question "clearly formulated" and "narrow and specific." 5 1 According
to the Court, the General Assembly did not ask about the legal
consequences of the declaration (i.e., whether Kosovo had achieved
statehood as a result of it). 52 Instead, the question asked whether the
53
declaration was prohibited by international law.
With the scope of the question determined, the ICJ delivered its
opinion. The Court first turned to general international law to see
whether there is a principle that prohibits unilateral declarations of
independence. 54 Finding "no case" where state practice would suggest
a prohibition on the act of making a declaration unilaterally, the
Court concluded that the declaration did not violate general

para. 1 (listing among the Security Council's permanent members, the United States
and the Soviet Union).
44.
G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 38, para. 5.
45.
U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1; see also Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 65(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute] ("The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request
of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to make such a request.").
46.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 44 (July 9).
47.
Id.
48.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 35 (July 22).
49.
Id. 1 44.
50.
Id. I 48-49.
51.
Id. 7 51.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. 56.
54.
Id. IT 78-79.

2012] ARTICULA TING REMEDIAL SECESSION.- SIGNAL AND AFFIRM

219

international law. 55 Opponents of Kosovo's actions argued that the
principle of territorial integrity implies that international law
prohibits unilateral declarations of independence. 56 The Court
dismissed this argument in one sentence concluding that the
57
principle only applies to relations between states.
Finally, the Court looked to the lex specialis created by Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) for any prohibitions on the specific
unilateral declaration made by Kosovo. 58 The Court concluded that
the resolution creates a framework whereby all legislative power is
temporarily vested in the Assembly of Kosovo subject to the
overriding authority of a Special Representative to the SecretaryGeneral. 5 9 However, whether or not Resolution 1244 and the
temporary government it creates are in conflict with the unilateral
declaration is ultimately a moot point because the entity that
declared independence is not governed by the resolution. 60 The Court
found that the entity is not the Assembly of Kosovo, but instead the
"the democratically-elected leaders of our people" as stated by the
declaration itself. 61 Because the resolution does not produce binding
international law with respect to this entity, the entity cannot be in
violation of the international law created by the resolution.6 2 The
Court concluded that because neither general international law nor
Security Council Resolution 1244 prohibits Kosovo from unilaterally
declaring independence, Kosovo's declaration does not violate
63
international law.
The reasons the Court gave for limiting its opinion to answering
an esoteric question of international law are not convincing. Even the
best argument in defense of its opinion cannot withstand criticism.
Based on previous requests for advisory opinions, there is an
argument for claiming that the General Assembly's question does not
inquire about the legal consequences of Kosovo's declaration. In the
past, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have
specifically stated that they were interested in the legal consequences
of various state actions, 6 4 while here, the question put forth by the

55.
Id. 7 79, 84.
56.
Id. 80.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
85-121.
59.
Id.
85, 89.
60.
Id. 118.
61.
Id.
75, 103, 105, 107.
62.
Id. 7 115, 118.
63.
Id. 7 122.
64.
See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16,
1 (June 21) (stating the question put to
it by the Security Council: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276
(1970)?"); see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
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General Assembly does not mention anything about legal
consequences. However, this argument seems hollow considering the
natural tendency to associate declarations of independence with
changes in sovereignty. This criticism is especially damaging in light
of the Court's ability to reformulate or clarify questions of various UN
65
organs.
International commentators echo this criticism. 66 One analysis
characterizes the opinion as arbitrarily dividing international rights

and obligations concerning "declaring" and "effecting" independence
'67
and finds the distinction "artificial and not necessarily convincing.
Some commentators argue that the Court abdicated its responsibility
68
as advisor to the various bodies of the United Nations.

Commentators criticize the ICJ for missing an important opportunity
to

set down

rules in

an

area

of fundamental

importance. 6 9

In

addition, there is confusion in the international legal community
about which side

prevailed. 70

Concurring and dissenting judges levied similar complaints in
separate opinions. Judge Skotnikov suggested that international law
does not regulate declarations of independence per se, but instead
addresses claims for statehood that underlie them.7 1 He warned that
the vagueness
associated with
the
Court's
conclusion
that
international law contains no prohibition on unilateral declarations of

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
1 (July 9) ("What are the
legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by
Israel... ?").
65.
Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 50.
66.
See, e.g., Bjbrn Arp, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo
and the InternationalProtection of Minorities, 11 GER. L. REV. 847, 847 (2010) ("The
Court's short and sometimes clumsy reasoning seem a tortious exercise of avoiding
from commenting on complex and difficult issues .. ");Thomas Burri, The Kosovo
Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links, 11 GER. L. REV. 881,
885 (2010) ("The weakest point of the ICJ's opinion.., is the argument ...that there
is no necessary link between, on the one hand, self-determination or secession and, on
the other, the declaration of independence."); Robert Muharremi, A Note on the ICJ
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 11 GER. L. REV. 867, 874 (2010) ("[T]he ICJ should have
exercised its judicial authority to interpret the question asked by the General Assembly
more profoundly ...").
67.
Muharremi, supra note 66, at 873.
68.
See, e.g., id. at 874 ("[The ICJ] failed to properly discharge its judicial
functions ....); Jed Odermatt, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: A Missed Opportunity?
5 (Oct. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("The Court was free to
interpret the question in a narrow fashion as it did. However by doing so, it failed to
furnish advice to the organ that requested it.").
69.
See, e.g., Burri, supra note 66, at 882 ("Nothing less than the foundation of
the international order was at issue.... [The ICJ] failed to seize the opportunity.").
70.
See Bilefsky, supra note 41, at A4 (reporting that legal experts advised that
the opinion could "allow both sides to declare victory").
71.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141,
17 (July 22)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov).
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independence may have an "inflammatory effect. '72 Other judges
predicted that vagueness regarding the validity of an ethnic group's
claim of statehood might cause interruptions in international peace
and security. 73 Even Judge Koromoa, who dissented from the Court's
opinion, based his opinion on the ground that a state's right to
territorial integrity trumps the right to self-determination. 74 This
reasoning implicitly rejects the Court's narrow interpretation of the
question that does not include issues concerning the end or beginning
of a sovereign.
Ultimately, the Court's hesitation is likely due to the difficulty of
solving the problem of remedial secession. Looming large are the
specters of civil war, in the case of an overly broad right, and
oppression, in the case of an overly narrow right. The Court's
unwillingness to enter this political thicket may stem from an acute
awareness of the undesirable consequences of any decision stating the
requirements for completing a unilateral secession. This difficulty
suggests that multiple UN organs must work together in order to
provide a realistic solution.
A prescription for the General Assembly and ICJ's role in the
future of remedial secession is discussed below. 75 Before providing an
analysis of the proper method for articulating the right to selfdetermination as it applies to remedial secession, Part III discusses
the history and law of other forms of external self-determination such
as colonization and foreign occupation in order to provide useful
background.

III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS
In the hands of would-be States, self-determination is the key to
opening the door and entering into that coveted club of statehood. For
existing states, self-determination is the key for locking the door
76
against the undesirable from within and outside the realm.

At its inception, the United Nations recognized the promotion of
77
self-determination as a "purpose" in Article 1 of the Charter.
Although Article 1 was probably intended to refer only to internal
self-determination, it was eventually used as a legal basis for forms of

72.
Id.
73.
Id. 6 (concurring opinion of Judge Yusuf).
74.
Id.
20-22 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
75.
See infra Part V.
76.
CASSESE, supra note 12, at 6.
77.
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 ("The purposes of the United Nations are: ... to
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples ....
").

222

VANDERBIL TOIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:211

external self-determination. 78 Article 55 gives the right a legal
character by referring to self-determination as a "right" and
"principle," not merely a purpose. 7 9 Additionally, subsequent practice
of the United Nations has demonstrated that self-determination is of
a legally binding nature.80 In modern international law, the existence
of the right is not in dispute. 81 Yet, as the Kosovo advisory opinion
demonstrates, the contours of self-determination as applied to
remedial secession are contested.8 2 It is one thing to state that
peoples have a right to self-determination, but it is quite another to
craft specific rules for when and how a people may exercise that right
and to apply those rules to the messy world of international
relations.

83

A. Decolonization

Unlike other forms of external self-determination, the right to be
8
free from colonization is well defined.

4

The General Assembly, in

Resolution 1514 (XV), declared that colonization is a violation of
"fundamental human rights.

'8 5

It also stated that the right to self-

determination includes the right of peoples to "freely determine their
political status."8 6 Finally, it called upon states to cease armed action

against dependent peoples (i.e., peoples under colonial rule) and to
take "immediate steps" to transfer governing authority to those
peoples.8 7 The General Assembly also passed Resolution 1541 (XV),

78.
See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 65-66 (explaining that Article 1 not only
"enshrined-the right of the whole population... to internal self-determination" but also
proclaimed external self-determination, whereby States have an "obligation ...to
refrain from interfering with the independence of other States").
79.
See U.N. Charter art. 55.
80.
See Doehring, supra note 2, at 49 (noting UN organs' resolutions,
international covenants, and the practice of the ICJ as examples of subsequent
practice); Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 22 (suggesting that the view of selfdetermination being a legal right "derives above all" from resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly).
81.
See Doehring, supra note 2, at 50 (explaining that the characterization of
self-determination "as a political programme ... not as a legal duty ... cannot be
regarded as representative of the present-day interpretation").
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
82.
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 104 (July 22)
See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 180 (1993)
83.
(suggesting that the attitude against recognizing claims of external self-determination
stems from a desire to avoid opening a "Pandora's box" for minority claims).
See Doehring, supra note 2, at 52 ("[The] demand for decolonization is to be
84.
found in Chapter XI of the UN Charter ....); see also Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 132 (Can.) ("The right of colonial peoples to exercise
their right to self-determination by breaking away from the 'imperial' power is now
undisputed....").
85.
Colonial Countries Declaration, supra note 30, 9 1.
86.
Id. 92.
Id. 99 4-5.
87.
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which tied the obligations for states administering territories as
colonies to the declarations made in chapter XI of the Charter."8 In
chapter XI, member states administering territories where people
have not attained self-government are obligated to develop
mechanisms to promote self-government.8 9 By declaring that colonies
fall into the non-self-governing territory category, the General
Assembly imposed a new set of obligations upon states. The General
Assembly resolved that a non-self-governing territory can attain selfgovernment in one of three ways: emerging as a new sovereign state,
associating with an existing state, or integrating with an existing
90
state.
Subsequently, in Resolution 2625 (XXV), the General Assembly
established that states are required to take steps to bring about a
"speedy end to colonialism." 91 The General Assembly further
elaborated that a colony has a status "separate and distinct" from
that of a parent state administering it.92 These principles were based
"under the Charter."93
While enunciating these principles of self-determination, the
General Assembly balanced them against a sovereign state's right of
territorial integrity. After restating that the right to selfdetermination includes the right to be free from external interference
and that it constitutes a fundamental human right, Resolution 2625
94
(XXV) included text concerning the principle of territorial integrity.
Notably, the declaration provided a caveat to this principle by
indicating that it might be voidable should the government not
represent "the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction to race, creed or colour." 95 This caveat bears a striking
resemblance to the principle announced in the U.S. Declaration of
Independence; a government may forfeit its legitimacy as sovereign
by systematically denying a portion of its subjects' fundamental
96
human rights.
The ICJ's role in the development of this right came in a series of
advisory opinions concerning Namibia and Western Sahara.Initially,
in its opinion on Namibia, the Court concluded that Resolution 1514

88.
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, princ. I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15,
1960) ("The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI
should be applicable to territories which were then known to be of the colonial type.").
89.
U.N. Charter art. 73, para. b.
90.
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 88, Annex, princ. VI.
91.
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 30, at 124.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.; see also CASSESE, supra note 12, at 114 (interpreting this phrase to give
racial or religious groups that are denied access to government institutions a potential
right to secede from an existing state).
96.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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(XV) is an important stage in the development of the right to external
self-determination. 9 7 The Court acknowledged that its interpretation
of the scope of this right is influenced by UN resolutions and other
events that produce customary international law. 98 Finally the Court
concluded that, because of these resolutions, the field has been
"considerably enriched" and that it cannot ignore these developments
while properly carrying out its functions. 99
The ICJ later applied these principles in an advisory opinion
concerning Western Sahara.l0 0 After concluding that it had
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion and that there are no
compelling reasons for it abstain from delivering an advisory
opinion, 1° 1 the Court immediately turned to the Charter and to
General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV), and 2625 (XXV)
for guidance on the proper scope of the external right to selfdetermination as applied to decolonization.' 0 2 This reliance on the
principles enumerated by the General Assembly is remarkable
because, unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly does not
have de jure authority to bind member states.' 0 3 In other opinions,
the Court has even gone so far as to declare that General Assembly
04
Resolution 2625 (XXV) reflects customary international law.'
Ultimately, some commentators argue that the UN practice of
implementing a right to be free from decolonization was instrumental
10 5
in establishing the right to external self-determination.

97.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, T 52 (June 21).
See id. 7 53 ("[T]he Court must take into consideration the changes which
98.
have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain
unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United
Nations and by way of customary international law.").
99.
Id.
1 (Oct. 16)
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12,
100.
(quoting the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion concerning Western
Sahara's status at the time of colonization and its relationship to various states).
101.
Id. 77 20, 52.
102.
Id.
54-59.
Compare U.N. Charter art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree
103.
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter."), with id. art. 14 ("[T]he General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation .... "). Other commentators
have noted this distinction. See, e.g., DAMROSCH ET. AL., supra note 1, at 142 (drawing a
distinction between the Security Council's ability to adopt compulsory resolutions and
the General Assembly's power of recommendation).
104.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, I 191-93 (June 27).
105.
Doehring, supra note 2, at 53.
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B. OccupationDuring InternationalArmed Conflict
The law of occupation during international armed conflict is
another example of a relatively well-defined aspect of the right to
external self-determination however, because the international
system has no single, independent body applying this law to specific
cases, its rules can be exploited.
Section III of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War' 06 forms the heart of the law of
occupation. The treaty grants broad authority to an occupying power.
For example, an occupying power may "undertake total or partial
107
evacuation of a given area" when military reasons justify doing so.
The occupying power may compel an occupied territory's nationals to
work to provide "for the needs of the army of occupation" so long as
the nationals are at least eighteen years old and do not directly take
part in military operations.10 8 The occupying power may even, with
certain limitations, alter the penal code applicable to the territory's
nationals. 10 9 If the occupying power determines that a national is
guilty of espionage or sabotage, it may impose the death penalty. 110
However, an occupying force's power is limited and accompanied
by numerous obligations. For example, occupying powers must
provide facilities for the education of children."1 Unless "absolutely
necessary," an occupying power may not destroy real or personal
property belonging to private persons. 112 It may not discriminate or
sanction public officials or judges. 113 It has an affirmative duty to
ensure that food and medical supplies are available to the population,
to import
and this duty may even require an occupying power
114
necessary supplies from outside the occupied territory.
The right to self-determination is the limiting principle to the
law of occupation. Occupation does not "affect the legal status of the
territory in question." 1 5 Thus, the state's legal existence is not
destroyed by the occupying power; it is merely suppressed or
displaced. This principle is similar to the colonial context where a

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
106.
of War arts. 47-78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
107.
Id. art. 49.
Id. art. 51.
108.
109.
See id. art. 64 (permitting the occupying power to repeal or suspend penal
laws and enact provisions when doing so is necessary to the administration of justice or
required to maintain orderly government).
110.
Id. art. 68.
111.
Id. art. 50.
112.
Id. art. 53.
113.
Id. art. 54.
114.
Id. art. 55.
115.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I) art. 4,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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colony has a legal existence that is distinct from the sovereign
currently exercising power over it. 116 The occupying power must "take
all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety. '11 7 These provisions, combined with
the first Protocol to the Geneva Convention's declaration that peoples
can exercise the right to self-determination to counter foreign
occupation, demonstrate that an occupying power's rights end where
the right to self-determination begins. 118
The right to self-determination's role in foreign occupations has
increased over time. First, the rules promulgated in the 1907 Hague
Regulations dealt primarily with the preservation of ultimate
sovereignty in the temporarily suppressed government, 119 while the
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention focused on the rights of the
individual citizens in the occupied territory. 120 Secondly, it was
originally possible to end an occupation only via a peace treaty
between the occupying power and the temporarily suppressed
government. 121 International law now permits an occupying power to
transfer governmental authority to the suppressed government or
another group that legitimately invokes the right of external selfdetermination. 122
The birth of the state Bangladesh provides a good example of
such a transfer. In January 1970, the Awami League (a Pakistani
political party) did extremely well in the general elections for the
Pakistani National Assembly. 123 The Awami League's success posed a
problem for the West Pakistani military because the League openly
124
sought the secession of the East Pakistan territory from Pakistan.
On March 25, 1971, the West Pakistani military attacked Dacca, a
city in East Pakistan, 12 5 capturing the attention of several states and
international organizations. 126 Tensions remained high for
approximately six months as millions of East Pakistani refugees

116.
See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 30, at 124.
117.
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (Annex to the Hague Convention No. TV).
118.
See Protocol I, supra note 115, art. 1(4) ("[Pjeoples are fighting
the
exercise
of their .right
of selfagainst... alien
occupation.., in
determination ... ");CASSESE, supra note 12, at 92 ("Article 1 of the First 1977
Geneva Protocol supports the thesis that the right to external self-determination is
considered to arise when a State dominates the people of a foreign territory using
military means.").
119.
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 211.
120.
Id.
Id. at 214.
121.
122.
Id. at 215.
123.
Nanda, supra note 28, at 323.
124.
Id.
125.
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 174.
126.
Nanda, supra note 28, at 324-25.
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crossed the Pakistani-India border into India. 127 Meanwhile, the
Indian government secretly supported the Awami League by
providing war supplies, land to recruit and train volunteers, and
eventually, by invading and occupying East Pakistan. 128 The invasion
took place on December 6, 1971, just one day after India formally
recognized the sovereign country of Bangladesh in what was East
Pakistan. 129 A month after this invasion, approximately ten countries
either recognized or decided to recognize Bangladesh as a sovereign
state, 130 and by August of 1972, when the Security Council considered
admitting Bangladesh to the United Nations, eighty-six countries had
131
recognized it.
Although both the Security Council and the General Assembly
passed resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities from both sides
of the conflict, 132 a Security Council resolution calling for recognition
of Bangladesh could not pass because of a single dissenting
permanent member. 133 But the General Assembly was able to pass a
resolution calling for Bangladesh to be admitted to the United
Nations as a state.134 Thus, the end of a military occupation came not
with India (the occupying power) making a peace treaty with
Pakistan (the suppressed government), but instead, with India
transferring governmental authority over to a new entity, the Awami
League, exercising the right of self-determination to form the new
state of Bangladesh.
Contrast the facts and outcome of Bangladesh's successful bid for
self-determination with the conflict, still present today, in Northern
Cyprus. 135 In 1960, the United Nations declared that Cyprus was an

127.
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 174; Nanda, supra note 28, at 325.
128.
BENEVENISTI, supra note 83, at 174-75.
129.
Id. at 175.
130.
Nanda, supra note 28, at 325.
131.
BENEVENISTI, supra note 83, at 175.
132.
G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI),
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2793(XXVI) (Dec. 7, 1971);
S.C. Res. 307, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/307 (Dec. 21, 1971).
133.
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 175 (stating that China, a permanent
member of the Security Council, vetoed an otherwise "overwhelming majority" of the
Security Council in this regard).
134.
G.A. Res. 3203 (XXIX),
3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3203(XXIX) (Sept. 17, 1974)
(deciding to admit Bangladesh into the United Nations); S.C. Res. 351,
2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/351 (June 10, 1974) (recommending Bangladesh be admitted to the United
Nations). See generally U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 2 (stating that admission to the
United Nations is the decision of the General Assembly upon the Security Council's
recommendation).
135.
Turkey Urges Fresh Cyprus Talks, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4644652.stm (reporting Turkey's efforts to re-open
talks about a political settlement); UK Renews Offer over Cyprus Island, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/8353712.stm (reporting the United
Kingdom's offer to transfer control over some of Northern Cyprus to facilitate a peace
deal).
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independent republic and admitted it as a member. 136 At that time,
approximately 80 percent of its population was Greek in origin, and
18 percent was Turkish in origin. 13 7 The Turkish minority was
sympathetic to formally joining the state of Turkey. 138 Amendments
to Cyprus' constitution denied this minority the right to participate in
government affairs, and as a result, the group formed their own
government to manage their affairs in 1967.139 On July 20, 1974,
Turkey invaded Cyprus. 140 The invasion coupled with measures
taken by both sides caused approximately a third of the population to
become refugees. 141 Over the course of the Turkish occupation, the
territory has undergone various transformations in the type of
government that claims sovereignty over it, but in 1983, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus declared its independence and invoked
the right to self-determination. 142 Justifying its occupation by stating
that it was protecting the Turkish minority from being forcefully
unified with Greece, Turkey is still the only country to recognize a
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the territory it still
143
occupies.
The General Assembly has called the situation deplorable and
has called for the withdrawal of troops from Cyprus. 144 The Security
Council deemed the declaration of independence of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus to be invalid 145 and called upon other
states to not recognize the new entity as a state. 14 6 The matter is still
in dispute, and in September of 2008, Greek and Turkish Cyprus
14 7
inhabitants reentered negotiations.
These two instances where the right to external selfdetermination has been clarified with precision demonstrate two
lessons. Decolonization demonstrates that it is possible for the
General Assembly to lay down general rules for implementation of
the right and for the ICJ to apply those rules to a specific case. The
law of occupation shows that general rules that are without an
authoritative, independent body appointed to apply them allow
geopolitical interests to dominate the outcomes of disputes concerning
the right.

136.
Marios L. Evriviades, The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 227, 238 (1975).
137.
Id. at 228 & n.1.
138.
BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 177.
139.
Id. at 177-78.
140.
Id. at 177.
141.
Id. at 178.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 179.
144.
G.A. Res. 37/253,
7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/253 (May 13, 1983).
145.
S.C. Res. 541, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983).
146.
Id.
7.
147.
UK Renews Offer over Cyprus Island, supra note 135.
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IV. METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING

As stated at the outset, the purpose of this Note is not to opine
on the proper scope of the right to external self-determination as
applied to remedial secession but to recommend a method for
articulating and implementing the scope of this right. This Part
analyzes the juridical qualities of the international authorities that
could potentially provide rules for external self-determination.
A. State Practice
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (the Statute),
Article 38(1)(b) instructs the ICJ to apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law" to disputes properly
brought before it.148 Thus, general state practices accepted as law
constitute a body of law that binds states. 149 The substance of this
law must be ascertained primarily from actual practice and from
150
opinio juris of states.
The ICJ has discussed how to discover opinio juris in several
cases and advisory opinions. In Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, the General Assembly asked the ICJ for an
advisory opinion on the following question: "Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international
law?"'15 1 Several states argued that nuclear weapon nonuse since
1945 demonstrated an expression of opinio juris in the negative by
any state that could have used nuclear weapons. 152 Advocates on the
other side replied that no state had used a nuclear weapon since 1945
because the circumstances had not warranted their use, not because
they believed they were prohibited from doing so. 153 The Court sided
with the latter position. 154 This reasoning demonstrates that
customary international law is created not by states acting in a
certain way for a long period of time alone, but also by states doing so
because they believe they are required to by law. The Court originally
articulated this requirement for opinio juris in North Sea Continental
Shelf when it stressed that a subjective belief by states that a
particular settled practice is legally obligatory is necessary for the
155
creation of customary international law.

148.
149.
150.
I.C.J. 226,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

ICJ Statute, supra note 45, art. 38(1)(b).
See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 59.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
64 (July 8).
Id. 1.
Id. 65.
Id. 66.
Id. 67.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Feb. 20).
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There are reasons for preferring customary international law as
evidenced by state practice to flesh out the scope of international law.
States are the primary units of the international legal system. 15 6 The
Statute expressly recognizes state practice as a proper source of
international law for the ICJ to apply. 157 The United Nations is based
158
on the principle of sovereign equality for all its members.
However, state practice as a source of international law is not
without limitations. First, it is slow. The international community
must wait for controversies to arise concerning a particular area of
international law in order for clarification to take place. 159 The
process cannot make rules prospectively. 160 There is no guarantee
that a sufficiently uniform consensus can be defensibly identified
from what is bound to be variance in state practice on a particular
issue. Finally, the subjective belief requirement is difficult to prove.
As discussed above, judges deciding Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons threw up their hands after they concluded there
were multiple plausible explanations for the nonuse of nuclear
weapons and simply ruled that there was not opinio juris regarding
the practice. 161 Judicial processes that include a determination of
subjective belief involve a great amount of discretion. Standards like
these allow a judge to assert a personal policy preference under the
guise of a legally reasoned conclusion.
In addition, the right to remedial secession presents a case
where state practice may be a particularly inappropriate method for
articulating international law. First, a state is, by definition, dealing
with an entity that is not currently a state but is seeking to become
one. The question at issue is how the law should classify the entity or
group of people. If a group of people has a meritorious claim for a
right to secede, these people do not quite constitute a state. They are
not the original state's own citizens any longer, and it is not clear that
they are citizens of a new state at this point. The ICJ hinted at this
argument when it stated that the principle of territorial integrity (a
right only applicable against other states) did not prohibit the people
of Kosovo from declaring independence because, at that time, they
162
were uncontestably not a state.

156.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
157.
ICJ Statute, supranote 45, art. 38(1)(b).
158.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
159.
See Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (arguing that
the typical "case-by-case process of customary international law" is ill-suited to meet
the needs of an increasingly complex and globalized world).
160.
See id.
161.
See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
162.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 80 (July 22).
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Second, the group seeking to secede is challenging the very
sovereignty that states claim entitle them to deny the group's
independence. Put another way, it is not clear that the bundle of
rights conferred by sovereignty includes the competence to decide
whether sovereignty trumps a people's right to self-determination in
a particular situation. Even if sovereignty entails this right, the point
is moot because a group seeking secession is implicitly arguing that
the sovereign's authority is invalid as applied to the group. 163 Thus,
the very ability of a state to claim the protections of its statehood is in
dispute, and having a state arbitrate the scope of this right therefore
164
creates an existential conflict of interest.
Third, a lesson from history applies here: both the Bangladesh
and Cyprus examples demonstrate the tendency of states to use
165
ethnic minorities as pawns to serve their geopolitical interests.
Under the guise of promoting human rights, history demonstrates
that the political motivations of an individual state can distort
applications of the law of occupation, a well-defined form of external
self-determination. 166 The need for a third party to resolve disputes of
this kind is readily apparent.
B. The GeneralAssembly
The General Assembly has no formal ability to bind members of
the United Nations. 16 7 Under the Charter, it is not a legislative body
with ongoing rulemaking authority, 6 8 and the Charter's framers did
not intend it to be one. 169 However, new demands on the
international community have produced a need for such a
supranational legislative body in some contexts. 170 The General
Assembly has been able to partially fill this void by use of its norm
creation power. 171 The General Assembly has frequently been able to

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163.
See Schachter, supra note 159, at 9 (asserting that the positions
164.
governments have taken when interpreting the right to self-determination have
"nearly always been linked to their political views and alignments").
See BENVENISTI, supra note 83, at 176 ("India gained important strategic
165.
advantages from these developments, which significantly weakened its longtime rival
[Pakistan].").
See supra Part III.B.
166.
167.
Christopher C. Joyner, Conclusion: The United Nations as International
Law-Giver, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 159, at 432,
440. There are two exceptions to this rule: budgetary questions and membership
questions. See supra note 131 (describing an example of the General Assembly's role in
the admission of new states into the United Nations); see also U.N. Charter art. 17(1)
("The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.").
168.
Joyner, supra note 167.
169.
Schachter, supra note 159, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
170.
See Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
171.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 159, at 131, 145 (stating that while formally
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clarify existing international law and, in some cases, to set the stage
for creating entirely new rights. 172 One example already discussed is
the right to self-determination as applied to colonization. 1 73 In these
contexts, the General Assembly exhibits a quasi-legislative
character.174
Perhaps the best example of the General Assembly leadership
resulting in a rule of international law is Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala.
There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered the legal effects of a General Assembly Resolution. 175 The
case arose when two Paraguay nationals brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against
another Paraguay national for the torture and wrongful death of their
relative. 176 Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1350, also known as
the "Alien Tort Statute.' 1 77 This statute gives federal district courts
original jurisdiction over a civil action in tort committed "in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'1 78 The district
court had previously dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 179 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.' 8 0 The parties
agreed that the action did not arise under a treaty of the United
States and, thus, jurisdiction had to be based on the "law of
nations.' 18 1 The Second Circuit then noted that an express treaty
provision is not necessary for a violation of the law of nations to take
place under The Paquete Habana182 when "general assent of civilized
nations" has led to a "settled rule of international law.' 8 3 The court
18 4
considered the general assent requirement to be "stringent.'
To determine whether torture was an act in violation of the law
of nations, the court first consulted the Charter. 8 5 It stated that the
Charter provides a "broad mandate" for states to achieve respect and
observance of "human rights and fundamental freedoms.' 8 6 The
court recognized that this vague language has led to disputes over the
scope and contours of various human rights, but found that the

nonbinding, General Assembly resolutions can have an impact in creating
international law).
172.
Joyner, supra note 167, at 446; see Hannum, supra note 171, at 145-47.
173.
See supraPart III.A.
174.
Joyner, supra note 167, at 440.
175.
Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
176.
Id. at 877-78.
177.
Id. at 879.
178.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
179.
Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 880.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 880.
182.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
183.
Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 881.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. at 882.
186.
Id. at 881-82.
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particular right at issue-the right to be free from torture-is
undisputedly a part of international law. 8 7 As evidence, the court
cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).188 Additionally, the court found
General Assembly Resolution 3452, titled Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of particular
relevance. 8 9 That resolution defines the term "torture," expressly
prohibits a state from engaging in any torturous acts, and declares
that victims of torture are afforded a remedy. 190 The court found this
resolution important because it "specif[ies] with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter."'191 The court found
General Assembly resolutions to be "formal and solemn
instrument[s], suitable for rare occasions when principles of great
and lasting importance are being enunciated.' 1 92 Finally, the court
noted that the declaration was adopted without dissent. 193 The court
concluded that prohibition of torture is a part of the law of nations
194
and remanded the case to the district court.
Because the solution in this Note advocates for the General
Assembly to take a central role in making international law, the
advantages and disadvantages of making law via the General
Assembly are discussed in Part V.
C. The InternationalCourt of Justice
195
The ICJ is the principle judicial organ created by the Charter,
but it is not the final interpreter of the Charter. 96 A decision
97
produces binding effects on only those parties before the Court, and'
it therefore does not have a stare decisis effect. 198 The ICJ may not
create law but may apply law already created. 199 Notwithstanding
these formal limitations on its power, many international lawyers
consider the Court's decisions to be highly persuasive authority. 200 Its
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Id. at 882.
188.
Id.
189.
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/10408 (Dec. 9, 1975).
190.
Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 882-83 (quoting G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), supra note
189, arts. 1, 3, 11).
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Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
192.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Id. (citing M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations
and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816 n.18 (1978)).
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Id. at 884.
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U.N. Charter art. 92.
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Doehring, supranote 2, at 54.
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ICJ Statute, supranote 45, art. 59.
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DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 134.
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JCJ Statute, supranote 45, art. 38.
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authority is diminished, however, when the decision involves
20 1
politicized matters.
The Court has jurisdiction in two instances: contentious cases
and requests for advisory opinions.20 2 Only judgments made by the
Court in contentious cases are binding on states. 20 3 States must
consent to jurisdiction before the Court can rule on the merits of a
dispute, and that consent can be ad hoc or based on a prior
agreement.2 0 4 Additionally, states may consent to compulsory
jurisdiction over a number of broad categories enumerated in the
205
Statute.
The ICJ is permitted to consult sources such as international
covenants, international custom as evidenced by state practice, and
judicial decisions and teachings of various nations. 20 6 This limited
power to apply but not create international law explains why the ICJ
has never articulated a precise definition of the right to selfdetermination as applied to remedial secession. 20 7 However, when the
counters of a particular aspect of the right have been debated and
articulated by an authoritative political body or a group of states, the
ICJ has not hesitated to apply that law. In the decolonization context,
for example, the ICJ has found that it has a duty to enforce the
development of the right to self-determination because it has been
"considerably enriched" by the General Assembly. 208 The Court
articulated this process in North Sea Continental Shelf, accepting in
principle an argument that provisions of a multilateral convention
can have norm-creating effects which, if accepted by opinio juris, can
become part of customary international law and bind states not party
to the convention.20 9 It cautioned, however, that the Court should not
210
"lightly" find that such a process has occurred.
The reasons for the ICJ's hesitation are familiar to those
acquainted with basic social and political philosophy but are worth
repeating. They are the same concerns that come with any
lawmaking done by a politically insulated body with limited access to
facts. The Supreme Court of the United States stated them succinctly
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.211 Again, a federal court was faced with a
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Id. at 135.
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Id. at 857.
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U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
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DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 857.
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ICJ Statute, supra note 45, art. 36(2).
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Id. art. 38.
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Doehring, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
52-54 (June 21).
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16,
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 71 (Feb. 20).
209.
210.
Id.
542 U.S. 692, 726-28 (2004).
211.
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claim brought under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, and the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to provide guidance as to what evidence is
needed in order to allow a court of the United States to hear a tort
2 12
claim based on a violation of the law of nations.
The Supreme Court's analysis emphasized the shifting paradigm
concerning the proper role of judges in a democratic society. In the
late eighteenth century, it was generally accepted that common law
was discovered by judges, not created by them. 213 However, by 1881,
Oliver Wendell Holms explained:
[11n substance the growth of the law is legislative ...[tihe very
considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of
life. I mean, of course, considerations of which is expedient for the
214
community concerned.

The Supreme Court concluded that determining whether an
international norm exists will inevitably involve a degree of discretion
on the part of the judge. 215 Creating a new rule of international law
or new cause of action is better left to a legislative body because there
are issues that are beyond the competence of a court-with its
necessarily limited access to facts-that a legislative body can better
resolve.2 16 However, the Supreme Court recognized that some actions
are unambiguously prohibited under international law, and
instructed lower federal courts to permit actions to go forward when
the claim "rests on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
''2 17
features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have recognized.
The Supreme Court struck a balance between the desire to avoid the
creation of new law and the duty of a judiciary to apply the law
already created.
The ICJ is ill-placed to create the scope of the right of selfdetermination as applied to remedial secession, but is in an ideal
position to apply rules already created by the General Assembly to
UN member states because those states must abide by ICJ decisions
and because the ICJ is politically independent.

212.
Id. at 724-28.
213.
Id. at 725.
214.
Id. at 725-26 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 31-32
(Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1963)).
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Id. at 726.
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Id.
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Id. at 725.

236

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.211

V. PRESCRIPTION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Summary of the Issues
The conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and the
right to self-determination involves questions of the most
fundamental nature of the international law system. The system
views states as the primary objects of regulation. 218 As such, it might
seem logical to use state practice, as aggregated through the behavior
of individual states, as the proper method to ascertain the criteria for
permissive uses of the right. However, this method is problematic.
The terms under which a new state may be created, or, conversely,
the terms under which a state will be required to relinquish sovereign
control, cannot be exclusively created via state practice for obvious
reasons. In any individual circumstance, a state would be tempted to
favor a strong right to territorial integrity, and this temptation
creates a bias toward indefinite curtailment of the right to selfdetermination. To mitigate this concern, the rules should be created
by a group that represents the world's nations as a whole, acting
prospectively. Based on these observations, the General Assembly is
ideally placed to set down such a set of rules.
At the same time, history demonstrates .that geopolitical
interests can distort or even paralyze the UN political organs when
the time comes for implementing and applying already created rules
to a specific situation. 219 In addition, the General Assembly has no
formal ability to provide legally binding resolutions on member
states, and thus, is in a poor position to enforce the rules it
promulgates. 22 0 Naturally, the ICJ's independence from the political
organs and its ability to bind parties before it in contentious cases
makes it well suited to implement the right in a particular
situation. 2 21 However, as the Kosovo advisory opinion demonstrates,
the ICJ's usefulness will only go as far as the robustness of the
General Assembly's resolutions.
B. Signal and Affirm
With these considerations in mind, the United Nations should
use the signal and affirm method-the method the United Nations
utilized when it created international prohibitions on colonization
and torture-to articulate the specific contours of the right to
external self-determination as applied to remedial secession. Under

218.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
219.
See supraPart III.B.
See supra note 102.
220.
See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 (requiring member states to comply with
221.
the ICJ's decisions in contentious cases to which it is a party).
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this method, the General Assembly would adopt, by resolution, a set
of rules for determining where a state's sovereign right to territorial
integrity ends and a peoples' right to remedial secession begins.
Those rules would then be applied to specific situations by the ICJ in
contentious cases under its jurisdiction.
In order to satisfy various political and legal concerns, the
General Assembly's resolution should have the following attributes.
First, like Resolution 3452-relied on by the Second Circuit in
Filartiga-itshould provide definitions of relevant terms. A definition
is especially needed for the term "peoples. '222 The resolution should
outline a procedure under which a group of people may peacefully
exercise the right to secession. It should state that the principles
announced in the resolution are based on the right to selfdetermination enshrined in the Charter. It should provide
jurisdiction to the ICJ over cases arising under the right, declare that
all member states in the UN consent to the Court's jurisdiction over
them in cases arising under it, and include a waiver for any sovereign
immunity. It should state that where a group's right to remedial
secession has been violated, international law affords a remedy. But
the General Assembly should refrain from adopting such a resolution
absent a unanimous vote of all members.
For remedial secession, the signal and affirm method takes
advantage of each organ's advantages but avoids their disadvantages.
The General Assembly-the most politically accountable UN organsets down the governing rules. 223 Thus, this process places policy
judgments in the hands of the group most apt to deal with them. The
General Assembly is able to make uniform rules that apply
prospectively. The General Assembly's ability to consider the full
consequences of the rules it adopts while having unbridled access to
relevant facts satisfies the concerns levied by the ICJ and the
Supreme Court of the United States in North Sea Continental Shelf
and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, respectively. 224 This preliminary move
by the General Assembly allows the ICJ to legitimately adjudicate

222.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [19981 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 123 (Can.)
("However, as the right to self-determination has developed by virtue of a combination
of international agreements and conventions, coupled with state practice, with little
formal elaboration of the definition of 'peoples,' the result has been that the precise
meaning of the term 'people' remains somewhat uncertain.").'
223.
I consider the General Assembly to be the most politically accountable
organ because its membership includes the greatest percentage of UN members.
Compare U.N. Charter art. 9, para. 1 ("The General Assembly shall consist of all the
Members of the United Nations."), with id. art. 23, para. 1 ("The Security Council shall
consist of eleven Members of the United Nations."), and id. art. 61, para. 1 ("The
Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the United Nations
elected by the General Assembly.").
224.
See supraPart JV.C.
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disputes concerning this politically thorny issue, much like the Court
225
did in its Namibia advisory opinion.
Additionally, as opposed to many interpretations that would
result from state practice, the General Assembly is more likely to
produce a single, uniform interpretation of this area of international
law. Various courts parsing through situation after situation of state
practice invariably leads to inconsistent rules, whereas, by definition,
a resolution or declaration is a single statement on the particular rule
of international law at issue.
Rules made prospectively are valuable for avoiding the use of
armed force. Because avoiding armed conflict is a primary goal of the
United Nations, 22 6 this attribute is particularly desirable. With the
rights of peoples and states described and agreed upon before a
conflict over sovereignty arises, a state will be less willing to suppress
a legitimate claim to secession, both because it has participated in the
shaping of the rules governing it and because of the credible threat of
enforcement by other members of the United Nations, especially the
2 27
Security Council.
Some might object and argue that when a state is oppressing its
people, it will be no more likely to acquiesce to the resolution adopted
by the General Assembly, even if the ICJ has ruled in favor of
secession. The point is well taken. However, in the event that the ICJ
rules in favor of secession, the virtue of this system is that it
authoritatively demonstrates to the world that there is a human
rights violation clearly in progress. This international transparency
and clarity makes the application of various enforcement tools more
politically viable and increases the probability of a peaceful and
lawful resolution to the conflict. Indeed, history demonstrates that
the relative vagueness of the right to self-determination in the
context of armed occupation allowed states to exploit vulnerable
countries in an effort to accomplish their geopolitical goals. 228 With
an independent body adjudicating disputes, the opposite will be true.
As the number of cases decided by the ICJ increases, so will the
229
effectiveness of these deterrence mechanisms.
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Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, T 53 (June 21).
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See supraPart III.B.
228.
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note 1, at 135-36.
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The value of the ICJ applying the rules set forth by the General
Assembly cannot be overstated. As a threshold matter, the initial
application of the resolution will confirm that the resolution rises to
the level of customary international law. As Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, once famously stated,
International law, or the law that governs between states, has at times,
like the common law within states, a twilight existence during which it
is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the
2 30
imprimatur of a court attests to its jural quality.

Thus, if the highest court in the world affirms the resolution put forth
by the General Assembly, it will crystalize the rules stated therein
and increase the resolution's authority from persuasive to binding.
Once a state or a people realize that the rights described in the
resolution are enforceable in a court of law, they will be much more
likely to follow those rules.
The second benefit of the ICJ applying rules to a specific instance
is the ICJ's independence from politics. The fifteen judges on the ICJ
are elected for nine-year terms by the Security Council and the
General Assembly, 23 1 and thus, the Court is not absolutely
independent. However, the Court's Statute requires staggered terms
for judges such that it would take six years to completely replace the
bench. 23 2 It would be practically impossible for a group of countries to
'stack the deck" with judges biased in their favor.
With this independence from politics comes the imprimatur of
legitimacy and of a chance for both sides to be fully heard. If a people
is ultimately judged not entitled to exercise the right of selfdetermination, the likelihood of future violence decreases because a
world forum has provided a meaningful opportunity to present the
case before a neutral decision maker. In addition, the insulation from
politics also allows the Court to apply the rules impartially, and
without pressure from various states not party to the litigation. By
preventing politics from clouding the application of the right in a
specific circumstance, the use of the ICJ ensures that judgments are
faithful to the rules agreed upon by all states. Finally, the insulation
of politics allows the Court to avoid the paralysis that has plagued
the political organs of the United Nations time and time again, such
as the particularly evident paralysis in the Kosovo situation itself and
2 33
the Bangladesh example.
Some might argue that such a robust role of the General
Assembly and of the United Nations in general is undesirable because
it departs from the original intent of the UN framers. Relatedly, they
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might also argue that state practice culminating in customary
international law is the only method of lawmaking that respects a
sovereign state's dignitary interests. Such a role would be
inappropriate, an objector might argue, because states had no notice
of this possibility when they entered the United Nations. The Charter
lists only two instances where a UN body's decision is binding on a
member state. 23 4 What is more, in one of those circumstances, the
state who has not submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court must first accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in a particularcase
23 5
before it will be bound by the decision.
The response to these arguments is threefold. First, statements
made by the General Assembly may represent evidence of customary
international
law. 236
General
Assembly
resolutions
or
recommendations on "important questions" must be decided by a twothirds vote. 2 37 These resolutions often "attract" practice. 238 In the

case of remedial secession, this Note argues that a resolution should
only be adopted by a unanimous vote because of the supreme
importance of the right in question. Thus, by definition, this solution
involves the assent of all UN members before any one member is
presented with a particular group attempting to secede.
Second, it is simply not accurate to assert that states had no
notice that the General Assembly can produce resolutions that may
eventually become part of customary international law. A member
state need only look to the history of the United Nations to observe
this phenomenon of resolutions becoming law. 239 By remaining
members of the United Nations, member states tacitly consent to the
legitimacy of this authority. Indeed, if states follow General Assembly
resolutions because they feel bound, it may now be customary
international law that the General Assembly has some limited
authority to bind member states. 240 The more resolutions the General
Assembly passes that become customary international law, the more
likely it is that a rule that states must follow General Assembly
resolutions generally is itself customary international law.
Third, a General Assembly interpretationof the Charter may, in
fact, be binding on member states. In 1945, when the San Francisco
Conference drafted the Charter, a committee report stated that the

234.
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General Assembly might have this power. 2 4 1 According to this report,
if the General Assembly's interpretation of the Charter is "generally
242
accepted," then it is binding on the members of the United Nations.
Because this proposed resolution would interpret the right to selfdetermination enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, 243 this rule
would apply to the resolution in question. Thus, it may not be the
case that a quasi-legislative General Assembly contravenes the intent
of the Charter's framers.
Finally, in the field of human rights, the General Assembly has
long been in the practice of interpreting vague provisions of the
Charter, distilling rights from it, and crystalizing those rights into
international law. 244 The number of human rights instruments
245
created by the United Nations is at least greater than sixty.
General Assembly resolutions make up the bulk of these
instruments. 246 The others were adopted by lessor bodies such as the
Economic and Social Council or other specialized agencies. 24 7 The
United Nations is, therefore, in the business of articulating and
clarifying human rights. Having any UN body other than the General
Assembly lay down rules defeats the legitimacy associated with
having every member of the United Nations meaningfully
248
participating.
An objector might argue that this proposed solution is not legally
249
possible because only states can be parties in a case before the ICJ.
The ICJ will thus be powerless to adjudicate secession cases, and the
cases will be relegated to national courts. Yet, whether or not the
entity before the Court is in fact a state is precisely the question the
Court must adjudicate. Thus, in order to answer whether the Court
can properly exercise jurisdiction over the party before it, the Court
would inquire as to whether it is a state. 250 If the party before it has
properly exercised the right to remedial secession, it would have
achieved state status and thus properly be before the Court. The fact
that the new state is not a member of the United Nations is likewise
not a bar to the Court exerting jurisdiction because the Statute
contemplates the possibility that a nonmember state might be party
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to a case adjudicated by the Court.2 5 1 If this reasoning is rejected by
the ICJ, the UN member states should amend the Charter and
Statute to allow an entity seeking to become a state to be a party in a
2 52
case before it.

VI. CONCLUSION

The ICJ's advisory opinion on the Kosovo declaration of
independence disappointed many international commentators. 253 The
Court declined the opportunity to address an area of international
law of fundamental importance. 25 4 The existence of the right to
external self-determination is not in dispute; however, the contours of
that right as applied to remedial secession have never been codified
by any organ of the United Nations. 255 History demonstrates that
outside the colonial context, the application of the external right to
self-determination has been uneven and controversial. 256 The relative
clarity and ease of application in the colonial context resulted
partially from the leadership of the General Assembly. 257 Through
consistent and frequent affirmations that the right to selfdetermination prohibits colonization, the General Assembly signaled
to the ICJ that international law recognizes this right. In affirmation
of the General Assembly's efforts, the ICJ responded with a liberal
interpretation of the right and many countries gained independence
as a result of that interpretation. 258 This signal and affirm process is
not unique to the right to self-determination, and, in fact, has been
the practice of the United Nations with respect to many other human
rights.
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The ICJ passed up an opportunity to apply the right in the
Kosovo advisory opinion, whereas it did not hesitate to do so in the
colonial context after the right had been fully fleshed out by the
General Assembly. 26 0 Many commentators have heavily criticized this
recent hesitation as nonsensical and hence disingenuous. 61 The
Court's opinion is so esoteric and vague that it has allowed both sides
to claim victory, and hence, has created the possibility for future
disputes that may be settled by the use of force. Since one of the
primary purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international
peace and security, it has a duty to lay down rules and provide a
peaceful method for their application.
While remaining agnostic as to the substantive contours of a
right to external self-determination as applied to the case of remedial
secession, this Note argues that the signal and affirm method of
international law creation is the best method for the United Nations
to articulate this right. This method allows the initial policy decisions
to be made by a body representing the entire United Nations, while
leaving specific application of these policies to a politically insulated
organ. By providing that the initial policy decision be made only by a
unanimous vote, the fundamental principle of international law, state
consent, is preserved.
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